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[Crim. Nos. 10330, 10563. In Bank. Apr. 23, 1968.] 
In re WILLIAM CAMERON on Habeas Corpus. 
(Two Cases.) 
[1] Habeas Corpus-Existence of Other Remedy-Exceptional 
Cases.-Habeas corpus is available to challenge violations of 
constitutional rights relevant to the determination of guilt if 
the petitioner presents an adequate excuse for failing to in-
voke his remedy by appeal. 
[2] Id.-Grounds-Writ as Substitute for Appeal-Fear of Death 
Penalty.-Fear of receiving the death penalty Oll a retrial 
excuses a failure to appeal for purposes of state habeas cor-
pus. 
[3] Id.-;'Grounds-Writ as Substitute for Appeal-Fear of Death 
Peruilty.-One convicted of murder in the first degree and sen-
tenced to life imprisonment was not precluded from seeking 
relief in habeas corpus to challenge violations of his constitu-
tional rights leading to his conviction, where, although it was 
[2] See Cal.Jur.2d, Habeas Corpus, § 13; Am.Jur., Habeas 
Corpus (1st ed § 22). 
McK. Dig. References: [1] Habeas Corpus, § 7 (5); Criminal 
Law, §1019; [2,3] Habeas Corpus, §12(3); [4] Reference, §17; 
(5] Criminal Law, § 471; Homicide, § 111; [6] Criminal Law, 
§ 1382.1; Homicide, § 262; [7-9] Criminal Law, § 467; [10) Criminal 
Law, § 1080(2) (b); [11] Criminal Law, § 1382.1(10); [12) Criminal 
Law, § 1382.1(12); [13) Criminal Law, §§ 104(4),1451; [14] Crimi-
llal Law, §§ 104(4),1457. 
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concluded by earlier reference that for motives nnspecified he 
personally abandoned his appeal, it appeared from the record 
before the referee that a substantial factor for the decision to 
do so, jointly made by defendant, his father and his counsel, 
was the fear of a possible death penalty on retrial. 
[4] Reference-Report and Findings-E1fect.-Although a review-
ing court is not bound by the findings of a referee, they are 
entitled to great weight. 
[5a, 5b] Criminal Law-Evidence-Confessions-Sufficiency of 
Evidence-Voluntariness.-A murder suspect's taped state-
ment to the police within two hours of the crime was voluntary, 
where, although he was only 22, had had no previous experience 
with the police, was not advised of his rights to counsel and to 
remain silent, was emotionally distraught and obviously in-
toxicated, with a blood alcohol level of .18 percent, he was 
nevertheless generally coherent, appeared rational, and was 
responsive to questions put to him, and where, moreover, he 
effectively resisted indicating what his questioners sought, 
namely, any real memory of the details of the killing. 
[6a, 6b] Id.-Appeal- Reversible Error - Confessions - Involun-
tarily Made.-A murder suspect's confession at a psychiatric 
examination arranged by the prosecution and two taped con-
fessions to the police, all made within 21 hours of the crime, 
were involuntary,. and prejudicial under any constitutional 
standards, especially on the issue of the degree of the crime, 
and their introduction into evidence was therefore reversible 
error, where, although the suspect was coherent, rational and 
responsive to questions put to him, he was, according to expert 
testimony, substantially under the influence of a massive 
(300 mg) dose of the tranquilizer Thorazine given to him when 
his blood alcohol level was .18 percent, making him unaware 
of the seriousness of the charge, careless of the outcome, and 
willing to be led into remembering more and more details of 
the crime, some of which did not in fact occur, and where on 
prior police questioning his memory h"d been blank. 
[7] Id.-Evidence-Confessions-Circumstances Rendering Con-
fession Involuntary.-A confession is not the product of a 
rational intellect and a free will, and is therefore involuntary, 
if the petitioner's will to resist confessing is overborne. 
[8] Id.-Evidence-Confessions-Circumstances Rendering Con-
fession Involuntary.-If an accused's will is overborne because 
of impairment of his ability to exercise his rational intellect 
and free will, such as by drugs, insanity or pressures engen-
[6] Use or administration of drugs or narcotics as affecting ad-
missibility of confession, note, 69 A.L.R.2d 384. See also Cal.Jur.2d, 
Evidence, § 422 et seq; Am.Jur.2d, Evidence, §§ 577, 578. 
Apr. 19GB] IN RE CAMERON 
f68 C.2d 487; 67 Cal.Rptr. 529, 439 P.2d 633) 
489 
dered by physical or psychological coercion, it is immaterial, 
in the context of the involuntariness of a confession made 
under such circumstances, whether that impairment was caused 
by police, third persons, the accused himself, or circumstances 
beyond anyone's control, nor is it material that the officers 
pursued no improper purpose in eliciting the confession or that 
the facts related by the accused in such confession are true. 
[9] Id.-Evidence-Confessions-Circumstances Rendering Con-
fession Involuntal')'.-The only issue in the voluntariness of 
a confession made in an interrogation in which the accused's 
will may have been overborne, is whether the accused's ability 
to reason or comprehend or resist were in fact so disabled that 
he was incapable of free or rational choice, and to determine 
this issue, the totality of circumstances surrounding the in-
terrogation must be considered. 
[10a, lOb] Id.-Appeal-Necessity for Objection-Evidence-Ex-
ception Where Confession Involuntal')'.-Where a confession 
was involuntary as a matter of law, a defendant is not pre-
eluded, by his failure to object at the trail, from raising the 
issue for the first time either on' appeal or in a habeas corpus 
proceeding brought after an ~cusable abandonment of his 
appeal. 
[11a,llb] Id.-Appeal-Reversible Error-Confessions-Effect of 
Earlier Statements.-In a murder trial in which four of de-
fendant's extrajudicial statements were introduced in evidence, 
error in admitting the last two was not. rendered harmless by 
the existence of the others, wbere evidence of his memory of 
the events was crucial to the critical issue of the extent of his 
intoxication and state of mind at the time of the killing, 
where, in the first statement, he, clung emphatically to his total 
lack of memory, where, even assuming the second statement 
had been admissible, his memory of the events was restricted to 
the barest details, and where it was only in the last two state-
ments that he purported to remember many more details, which 
had, in fact, been supplied to him by the police, and his 
memory of which, if real, was devastating to his defense. 
[12] Id.-Appeal-Reversible Error-Confessions-Effect of Other 
Confessions.-Generally, the introduction into evidence of an 
unconstitutionally obtained confession compels reversal re-
gardless of other evidence of guilt, and the exception to that 
rule in the case of a confession obtained in violation of 
Escobedo-Dorado is restricted to where there is also in evidence 
an equally or more damaging admissible confession made be-
fore the inadmissible confession and thus there was no danger 
that the former was the product of the latter; such exception 
is in no event applicable when the admissible evidence does 
not include any equally damaging confession. 
i: 
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[13] Id.-Rights of Accused-Fair Trial-Evidence-Suppression: 
Disposition of Cause-Discharge.-If the police or prosecution 
lose, defltroy, or otherwise make unavailable vital defense evi-
dence, they may disable the statc from ever giving defendant 
n fair trial and thus lead to his discharge rather than remand 
for new trial. 
[14] Id.-Rights of Accused-Fair Trial-Evidence-Suppression: 
Disposition of Cause-Remand After Reversal.-Loss by the 
prosecution, in the course of a murder case, of a plaid shirt 
and of a color film depicting the interior of the trailer in whieh 
the victim was killed did not entitle defendant to a discharge, 
as distinguished from remand for retrial, despite reversal of 
his judgment of conviction for constitutional errors on other 
grounds, where there was no actual suppression of evidence, 
and where, as a substitute for the color film, black and white 
photographs were available to the defense depicting the same 
areas in better detail, where the shirt had heen identified as 
belonging to the victim, and where, therefore, neither item 
would have' aided the defense in any material manner. 
PROCEEDING in habeas corpus to secure release from 
custody on the ground of involuntariness of confessions given 
under the influence of a drug. Writ granted arid petitioner 
remanded to custody of superior court for a new trial. 
George T. Davis, under appointment by the Supreme Court, 
for Petitioner. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Edsel W. Haws, Roger 
E. Venturi and Edward A. Hinz, Jr., Deputy Attorneys Gen-
eral, for Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, C. J.-After two trials in which the jury 
disagreed, a third jury in 1959 found William Cameron guilty 
of murder in the first degree and fixed the penalty at life 
imprisonment. Cameron has filed two petitions for a writ of 
habeas corpus alleging that involuntary confessions were 
introduced into evidence and that the prosecution deliberately 
suppressed evidence indicating that he was innocent. The two 
proceedings have been consolidated. 
The Attorney General contends at the outset that habeas 
corpus is not an available remedy on the ground that Cameron 
could have raised the contentions now urged on an appeal 
from the judgment but failed t.o do so. Although Cameron 
filed a timely notice of appeal, he failed to prosecute the 
appeal and on October 28, 1960, the Court of Appeal dismissed 
it. Cameron points out, however, that at that time there was a 
/~) 
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substantial risk that had he secured a reversal of the judgment 
on appeal he would have received the death penalty on retrial, 
for it was not until November 1963 that this court overruled 
People v. Grill (1907) 151 Cal. 592 [91 P. 515], and held that a 
defendant who successfully appealed from a judgment impos-
ing life imprisonment for first degree murder could not be 
given the death penalty on retrial. (People v.· Henderson, 
(1963) 60 Cal.2d 482, 495-497 [35 Cal.Rptr. 77, 386 P.2d 
677].) Cameron contends that the risk that he might receive 
the death penalty on retrial excuses his failure to pursue his 
remedy by appeal and that he acted with reasonable diligence 
to secure relief after the Henderson case was decided. l 
[1] Habeas corpus is available to chaUenge violations of 
constitutional rights relevant to the determination of guilt if 
the petitioner presents an adequate excuse for failing to 
invoke his remedy by appeal. (People v. Trewa,' (1966) 64 
Ca1.2d 141, 143-144 [49 Cal.Rptr. 100, 410 P.2d 620]; In re 
Spencer (1965) 63 Cal.2d 400, 406 [46 Cal.Rptr. 753, 406 P.2d 
33]; In re Shipp (1965) 62 Cal.2d 547, 552-553 [43 Cal.Rptr. 
3, 399 P.2d 571J.) Although we are not bound by federal 
standards in determining what constitutes an adequate excuse 
for failing to invoke the remedy by appeal, we have recognized 
the relevance of the federal habeas corpus test that permits 
denial of relief "to an applicant who has deliberately 
bypassed the orderly procedure of the state courts." (Fay v. 
Noia (1963) 372 U.S. 391, 438 [9 L.Ed.2d 837, 868, 83 8.Ct. 
822] ; see In re Shipp, supra, at p. 554; In re Sterling (1965) 
63 Cal.2d 486, 489 [47 Cal.Rptr. 205, 407 P.2d 5] ; People v. 
10n September 29, 1964, Ca,meron filed a petition for habeas corpus in 
the United States District Court. On December 11, 1964, that petition 
was dismissed because Cameron had failed to exhaust his state remedies. 
On December 23, 1964, Cameron filed a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus in the Solano County Superior Court. The court denied the petition 
on February 5, ] 965, on the ground that "Petitioner's proper forum is 
the . . . Court of Appeal whether his prayer for review by that tdbunal 
be for reinstatement of his appeal, for issuance of a writ, or both such 
remedies." On February 23, 1965, Cameron moved to recall the remittitnr 
and reinstate his appeal in the Court of Appeal for the Third Appellate 
District. That court appointed a referee to take evidence on stated 
questions and thereafter on Deeember 6, 1965, denied Cameron.'s motion 
OR the ground that he had personally abandoned his appeal. Cameron then 
petitioned for habeas corpus in the Court of Appeal for the First Appel-
late District, the appellate court having territorial jurisdiction to grant 
the writ, and that court denied his petition on February 9, 1966. On 
August 18, ]966, Cameron filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in 
this court alleging the use of involunt.ary confessions at his trial, and on 
October 31, 1966, he filed a supplemental petition raising the issue of 
suppression of evidence. . 
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Treloar, supra, at p. 144.) [2] Since the United States 
Supreme Court held in Fay v. N oia that fear of receiving the 
death penalty on retrial precluded finding that a failure to 
appeal was a deliberate bypass of a state remedy, we conclude 
that such fear also excuses a failure to appeal for purposes of 
state habeas corpus. (See In re Shipp, supra, at pp. 555-556.) 
[3] The question remains whether Cameron was in fear of 
the death penalty. In an earlier proceeding to determine 
whether or not to reinstate Cameron's appeal (see footnote 1, 
ante), the Court of Appeal ordered a reference directed to the 
question whether Cameron expressly or impliedly approved 
abandonment of his appeal, and thereafter it concluded that 
he personally abandoned the appeal. Although the reference 
was not directed to Cameron's motive for so doing, it appears 
from the record made before the referee that fear of the possi-
bility that Cameron might receive the death penalty on retrial 
was a substantial factor in the joint decision of Cameron, his 
father, and his counsel to abandon the appeal. Accordingly, 
we conclude that Cameron's abandonment of his appeal does 
not preclude his seeking relief in these habeas corpus proceed-
ings. 
From the record of Cameron's trial, it appears that Vivian 
Malone was killed and badly mutilated in her trailer at a 
trailer court on December 22, 1958, between 11 p.m. and 
11 :50 p.m. Cameron and his friend, Glenn A. Becker III, testi-
fied to the events preceding the killing. Both young men were 
students at Chico State College; each was married and had a 
baby. Both lived at the trailer court. Earlier in the day, Mrs. 
Malone had invited Cameron and his wife for a drink. They 
declined the invitation at that time but stated that they would 
accept at a later time. 
The Camerons had invited the Beckers to a taco dinner. The 
Beckers arrived about 6 :30 p.m. During dinner, between about 
6 :30 and 8 p.m., Cameron drank about two quarts of beer. The 
Beckers returned to their trailer after dinner. Shortly there-
after, Becker came back to the Cameron trailer and he and 
Cameron decided to buy some stout. Between 8 p.m. and 9 :30 
or 10 p.m., Cameron drank seven or eight CaIlli of· stout. 
Cameron then suggested to Becker that they go to Mrs. 
Malone's trailer to accept her invitation for a drink. 
Vivian Malone was a 50-year-old woman who lived alone. 
She answered the door clothed in a bathrobe and invited the 
men in. She had been drinking most of the day and was 
intoxicated. She brought out a bottle of whiskey, and each 
) 
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took a tumbler fuJI, appr()ximately two and Hm,e·fr}urths 
ounces of whiskey, diluted only by one ice cube. As they 
talked and drank, the conversation turned to sex. Mrs. Malone 
indicated her willingness to have sexual relations with both 
men. but both declined. 
Cameron testified that he poured himself two more drinks 
and that he did not know whether Mrs. Malone or Becker had 
any more to drink. He testified that he had no independent 
recollection of Becker leaving. He also testified that Mrs. 
Malone asked him to leave, that he stated he wanted to finish 
his drink, and that she began to call him foul names. He then 
recalls being kicked in the groin, but does not remember who 
kicked him. 
He further testified that he remembered nothing that 
oceurred after being kieked in the groin except for vague, 
fragmentary and disoriented recollections of the following 
specific faets: He recalled being on his hands and knees and 
seeing a body Ilnd some blood. lIe remembered Hit! iug 011 
Beeker's doorstep. He remembered sitting in a ear and hear. 
ing someone say that there had been a killing. He remembered 
being in a room, being interrogated by one of the poliee 
officers and Assistant Distriet Attorney Mulkey, and being 
told that he had killed a woman and severed her breast. He 
recalled being taken to a hospital and being given a shot. He 
remembered talking to two psyehiatrists and being in the 
offiee of a polygraph operator, Mr. MacVarish. He remem-
bered that Mr. MacVarish stated that Mr. Mulkey would not 
be pleased with the results of the tests and that they would 
have to be done over. He remembered being interrogated. His 
memory of all events following the time Mrs. Malone began 
calling him foul names was very vague and fragmentary. 
Becker confirmed Cameron's account of the evening until 
Beeker left Mrs. Malone's trailer about 11 p.m. He also testi-
fied that Cameron appeared at Becker's doorstep about 
11 :50 p.m. He appeared to be dazed, and told Becker that lIP 
thought he had killed Mrs. Malone. Beeker saw blood on 
Cameron's white jacket and went over to the Malone trailer, 
where he saw enough to know that something was wrong. 
Beeker then took Cameron to the Cameron trailer and tele-
phoned the poliee, who arrived within a matter of minutes, at 
midnight. They placed Cameron under arrest almost immedi-
ately, after being advised by Becker that Cameron was the 
man they were looking for. 
Cameron was placed in a squad car near the Malone trailer 
; I 
I 
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where he waited for about five or ten minutes. During this 
time, the officers were taking pictures of the interior of the 
trailer and the area surrounding it. Assistant District Attor-
ney Mulkey had been called to the scene, and viewed the 
interior of the trailer. He was told the general details of the 
killing, including the fact that Mrs. Malone's dog and cat had 
been killed. Actually, the cat was unharmed. 
Mr. Mulkey and one of the police officers then drove 
Cameron to the Chico police station. Mr. Mulkey noted that 
Cameron appeared to be under the influence of alcohol, and 
therefore had him examined by a physician at the police sta-
tion. The physician gave Cameron physical coordination tests 
and took a blood sample. The blood sample indicated that 
Cameron had a blood alcohol level of .18 percent. The physi-
cian and Mr. Mulkey both concluded, however, that Cameron 
was mentally competent for interrogation. Cameron was given 
fresh clothing by the police and Dlay have been questioned 
before a tape recording2 of the interrogation was made, begin-
ning at 1 a.m. The tape was made without Cameron's knowl-
edge and he was not advised of his rights. At the end of the 
taped interrogation, Cameron became hysterical and despond-
ent and asked the police to shoot him. l<'earing that Cameron 
might become suicidal, Mr. Mulkey ordered that he be taken 
to Butte' County Hospital and placed on a mental hold. 
Cameron arrived at the hospital about 3 :20 a.m. 
The attending physician at the hospital, Dr. Swinderman, 
placed Cameron under heavy sedation without knowing that 
he llad a high blood alcoholleveI of approximately .18 percent 
and without examining him. He acted upon a nurse's observa-
tions of Cameron and the story told her by the police that 
Cameron had recently committed a murder, was agitated, and 
was in danger of harming hhnself. Cameron was sedated by 
an injection of 300 milligrams of Thorazine (chlorpromazine) 
at approximately 3 :30 a.m. on December 23. The normal 
2'l'he poliee and :Mr. Mulkey dellY that Camet'on was interrogated 
hefore tile tape recording was started. At the end of the first tape, how-
ever, the following appears: . 
•• (CAMERON): Sheriff, you said take it easy. Thllt's right, you've had 
your borne you call go home to your wife and your baby. I can't. You 
keep put[ting) me through this. Wby do you keep put[t.iJlg] me through 
this ... You want to see me • . . go through it all ..• time nnd . . . 
time over and • . . oyer again-
" (Ma. MULl{EY): TlIis is the first time you've u:!ell through it, Dill. 
"(CAMERON): This is the second time I been through it-the Captain 
knows and you know! 
• • (:MR. MULKEY): All we wnut is the trutb, Bill." 
i 
I 
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initial dose is 25 to 50 milligrams,S and Thorazine is contra-
indicated for persons who are under the influence of alcohol 
because of the potentiating interaction between alcohol and 
Thorazine. Cameron was then' placed in a padded cell contain-
ing only a mattress. The hospital report states· that at 
3 :45 a.m. he was still sobbing loudly, but by 4 a.m. he was 
sound asleep. He remained sound asleep until awakened so 
that Mr. Mulkey could take him to DeWitt State Hospital. 
At 9 a.m. on December 23, Cameron was taken from the 
hospital, given breakfast, and driven to D~ 'Vitt State Hospi-
tal for a psychiatric examination. Mr. Mulkey accompanied 
him, and stated that Cameron dozed and slept on tIle trip. 
'Vhen they arrived at DeWitt, Mr. Mulkey told the two 
psychiatrists the information he had about the crime, and, 
because he had been misinformed, told them that Cameron 
had been sedated by sodium amytal4 at Butte County Hospi-
tal. The interview was conducted at 11 a.m. It was not taped, 
but th(' two examining physicians testified that they had taken 
notes. They testified that Cameron's speech was slow and 
slurred, and that he held his head in his hands as if he were 
suffering from a hangover. The physicians also testified t1lat 
in response to their questions Cameron confessed and stated 
that lle remembered killing Mrs. Malone and performing one 
of the mutilations but did not remember anything else. Thr 
interview lasted 20 minutes. 
Cnm('ron was then taken by Mr. Mulk('y and a police officf'r 
to the Criminal Interrogation and Identification Bureau I1t 
Sacramento, where they arrived at approximately 1 :30 p.m. 
He dozed and slept in the car on the way. An expert trained 
in the use of the polygraph as an interrogation technique 
int('rviewed him using that technique until 3 p.m. Mr. Mulkey 
had told the expert the infonnation he had about the crime SIl 
that the operator could use that information in his interroga-
tion of Cameron. At the end of Cameron's session with tllf' 
polygraph operator, Mr. Mulkey conducted another interro!!l1-
3Dr. Swinderman testified that he ordered the large dose partly he-
eause he hlld been told the patient might hann himself, but largely for 
the protection of the stllff that might have to go into tIle J'oom wh('f(' 
Cruneron was lllllced. From what he had been told about tIle natul'e of 
Cumeron'8 crime, he was quite concerned for the safety of his staff. 
4Sodium amy till is a hypnotic sedative. It puts people to slecp. Rnd 
Cameron been unacl' the influence of the sedath'e tlle doctors thought he 
bad becn givcn, hc would lwve b('en incol,cl'cnt or aslecp. Accorrlingly. 
wben they iutcn'icwed him, they thought all of thc sedlltion was out of 
his ~ystem. They attribued the mental and phYHical retal-dation noted in 
him to a hangover. 
) 
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tion that was taped, and Cameron stated that he was aware 
that his confession was being taped. He confessed for the 
third time to the murder and mutilation of Vivian Malone, 
stating that he remembered the events and recounting them in 
greater detail than before. 
The same afternoon, about 4 p.m., Mr. Barr, an attorney 
retained by Cameron's father, telephoned Sheriff Gillick of 
Butte County from Yreka and advised him that he had been 
retained to represent Cameroll. The sheriff told Mr. Barr that 
Cameron was in Sacramento. Mr. Barr testified that he told 
the sheriff not to take any further statements from Cameron 
until M.r. Barr could gct to Chico, and that he was coming to 
the county jail. He further stated that Sheriff Gillick told him 
that they already had their statements. Mr. Barr testified that 
he then advised the sheriff that unless he could have an assur-
ance that no further statements would be taken until he could 
get down to .Chico, he would call Mr. King, a local attorney, 
to see Cameron, and that the sheriff indicated it would not be 
necessary to call Mr. King. Sheriff Gillick acknowledged that 
Mr. Barr had called him, but denied that he was told not to 
take further statements. Cameron was not told that any attor-
ney had been retained for him. 
Cameron was returned from Sacramento to the Butte 
County jail at Oroville. He dozed and slept on the way, and 
arrived at 6 p.m. He was given a change of clothing and 
dinner. He was then taken to the police jail at Chico, where 
he was again interviewed, and his fourth confession was taped 
without his knowledge at 8 p.m. In this confession, Cameron 
stated that he remembered the events concerning the killing 
and described what allegedly occurred in much greater detail 
than in any of the earlier confessions. When Mr. Barr arrived 
in Oroville on the night of December 23, 1958, he was told 
that Cameron had been taken to Chico. Mr. Barr telephoned 
the Chieo jail and was informed that Cameron was under 
sedation and was asleep in his cell. Mr. Barr saw Cameron for 
the first time the morning of December 24. 
We appointed a referee to tnke evidence and make findings 
on the question whether each of the taped confessions and the 
confession to the physicians at De Witt State Hospital were 
voluntary and on the question whether any evidence favorable 
to the defense had been lost or suppressed. 
The referee held hearings and heard testimony. He received 
in evidenee a complete transcript of the third trial, the tran-
scripts of the first and second trials to the extent they were 
j 
r, 
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available, and the tape recordings of the first, third, and 
fourth confessions. 
With regard to the first confession, the referee found that 
although Cameron's speech was slurred, indicating that he 
was under the influence of alcohol, and that he was emo-
tionally distraught, he was coherent and his answers were 
rational and responsive to the questions he was asked. Based 
upon that standard, he concluded that the first confession was 
voluntary. He found that Cameron was rational and coherent 
during the second and third confessions, that Thorazine did 
not impair an individual's ability to answer questions. and 
that an individual under the influence of Thorazine had the 
ability to make a choice whether to answer questions. He 
therefore concluded that these confessions were voluntary. He 
found that Cameron was not threatened in any manner dur-
ing the fourth interrogation, and that Mr. Barr did not ask 
Sheriff Gillick for an assurance that no further interrogations 
would be had until lir. Barr had an opportunity to consult 
with Cameron. He concluded that the fourth confession was 
voluntary, and stated that even had such assurance been 
given, the fourth confession was voluntary. 
[4] Although we are not bound by the findings of the 
referee, they are entitled to great weight. (In re Imbler 
(1963) 60 Ca1.2d 554, 562 [35 Cal.Rptr. 293, 387 P.2d 6].) 
We adopt the referee's finding that Cameron's statements 
in all four interrogations were rational, coherent, and respon-
sive to the questions asked him. We conclude, however, that 
the referee erred in using the coherence, rationality, and 
responsiveness of Cameron's answers as the controlling cri-
terion of their voluntary character. [5a, Sa] We conclude 
that Cameron's first statement was voluntary, but that the 
second, third, and fourth statements were involuntary. Since 
those statements were clearly prejudicial under any of the 
standards that have been applied in reviewing constitutional 
error (see Chapman v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18, 24 [17 
L.Ed.2d 705, 710, 87 S.Ct. 824]; Payne v. A.rkansas (1958) 
356 U.S. 560, 568 [2 L.Ed.2d 975, 981, 78 S.Ct. 844]), particu-
larly on the issue of the degree of the crime, the judgment 
must be set aside. 
Since the effect of alcohol is different from that of Thora-
zine or a combination of both, we sha'l consider the first taped 
confession separately from the confessions obtained after 
Cameron had been given Thorazine. 
) 
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[7] A confession is involuntary unless it is "the product 
of a rational intellect and a free will." (Blackburn v. Ala-
bar/HI (1960) 361 U.S. 190, 208 [-1 L.Ed.2d 242, 249, 80 S.Ct. 
274] ; Daris v. NUI·tlt Cal'o/ina (1966) 384 U.S. 737, 739 [16 
L.Ed.2!l 895, 897, 81l s.n. 171l1].) It is not the product of a 
rational intelleet and a free will if the petitioner's will to 
resist confessiJig is oWI·borne. (Rogers Y. Hichmond (1961) 
365 U.S. 534, 544 [5 L.Ed.2d 760, 768, 81 RCt. 735] ; Peoplc 
v. Keichel (1963) 59 CaI.2t1 503, 520-521 [30 Cal.Rptr. 538, 
381 P.2d 394] ; People v. Lope.'< (1963) 60 Ca1.2d 223, 248 [32 
CaI.Rptr. 424, 384 P.2d 16].) [8] An aecused's will can be 
overborne by pressures eng('ll(leJ'ed by physical or psycho-
logical co('rcion on the part of law enforcement officers (Rog-
ers v. Richmond, supl'a; People v. Lopez, supra), or by the 
influence of a dmg (Tou,nsend Y. Sain (1963) 372 U.S. 293, 
308-309 [9 hEd.2d 770, 782-783, 83 S.Ct. 745]) or insanity 
(Blackburn y. Alaballla, slIpra) that impairs his ability to 
exercise his rational intellect and free will. If an accused's 
will is overborne because of impairment of his ability to exer-
cise his rational intelll'ct and free will, it is immaterial 
whether that impairment was caused by the police, third 
persons, thc aeeused himself, or ('ircul1lstances beyond any-
one's control. (Townsend v. Sain, supra.) Nor is it material 
that the officers pursued no improper purpose in eliciting the 
confession (Blackburn v. Alabama, supra) or that the facts 
related by the accused in such a confession are true (Rogers v. 
Richmond, supra). [9] The ouly issue is whether the 
accused's abilities to reason or comprehend or resist were in 
fact so disabled that he was incapable of free or rational 
choice. (1'ow1Isend v. Sain, supra.) To determine this issue, 
the "totality of circumstances" (Reck v. Pate (1961) 367 
U.S. 433 [6 L.Ed.2d 948, 81 S.Ct. 1541] ; Fikes v. Alabama 
(1957) 352 U.S. 191, 197-198 [2 hEd.2d 246, 250-251, 77 
S.Ct. 281] ; Payne v. Arkansas, supra, at p. 567 [2 L.Ed.2d at 
p. 980]) surrounding the interrogation must be considered. 
[5b] Petitioner was 22 years old, llad lived a model life, 
and had had no previous experience with the police. (Cf. Reck 
v. Pate, S1tpra, at p. 442 [6 L.Ed.2d at p. 954] ; compare, Stein 
v. New York (1953) 346 U.S. ]56, 185-186 [97 hEd. ]522, 
1542-1543, 73 S.Ot. ]077].) He was not advised of his rights 
to counsel, to remain silent, or to refuse to incriminate him-
self. (Davis v. North Carolina, supra, at p. 740 [16 L.Ed.2d at 
p. 897); Haynes v. Washington (1963) 373 U.S. 503, 510-511 
[10 L.E<1.2d 513, 518-519, 83 S.Ct. 1336]; Cllloinbc v. Con-
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nccticut (1961) 367 U.S. 568, 610 [6 L.Ed.2d 1037, 1062, 81 
S.Ct. 1860] ; Turner v. Pennsylvania (1949) 338 U.S. 62, 64 
[93 L.Ed. 1810, 1813, 69 S.Ct. 1352, 1357].) The tape of tIle 
first interrogation shows that he was obviously intoxicated 
and emotionally distraught. His blood alco]lOl level at the 
commencemcnt of the tape was .18 percent. Whcn he broke 
down and became hysterical near the end of the first tape,a 
Mr. Mulkey had him taken to Butte County Hospital and 
placed on a mental hold for fear he would take his life. When 
he arrived at the hospital, his emotional state was such that he 
was diagnosed a schizophrenic. He was overcome with horror 
by the killing and his assumption that he had done it. 
Both Mr. Mulkey and the physician who examined him 
pefore he was questioned concluded, however, that he was 
rational, physically coordinated (compare Unsworth v. Glad-
den (D. Ore. 1966) 261 F.Supp. 897), and sufficiently men-
tally alert to answer questions. The tape indicates that, 
although his speech was slurred and he had obvious difficulty 
pronouncing certain combinations of words, he understood the 
questions asked him and was responsive to them. Although he 
occasionally rambled on irrelevant subjects, he was gl'nerally 
coherent, appeared rational, and volunteered many details 
concerning the events of the day up to the point where Mrs. 
Malone began calling him foul names. Dr. Catton, a defense 
expert on the effect of alcohol on the body, testified at the 
trial that the degree of influence alcohol is exerting upon an 
individual can be measured, to a certain extent, by the coher-
ence, rationality, and responsiveness of his reactions to his 
surroundings. The coherence, rationality, and responsiveness 
of Cameron's answers is therefore relevant in determining the 
extent of influence that the alcohol was then exerting upon 
him. 
The most persuasive evidence, however, that Cameron's will 
to resist was not overborne during the first interrogation is 
that he effectively resisted telling Mr. Mulkey what he sought 
to elicit, namely, any real memory of the details of the crime. 
At that time everyone, including Cameron, assumed that he 
liThe following appears at the end of the first tape: 
" (CAMERON): Please get rid of me, Captain. 
" (Ma. MULKEY); Well, I'm gonna take you up to bed, Bill. Try to 
get some rest. 
" (CAMERON): (unintelligible) ... I don't want to ••. I just want 
to ... Please get rid of me. Just shoot mt:'. Do something. Like I'm a 
'scapeu convict or something. Look, I've got, I've got plenty insurance 
for my family every thin;; . . ." 
) 
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had killed Mrs. Malone. He had already so stated to Becker 
and Ii police officer at the scene. The interrogation sQught to 
elicit memory of details that would be relevant to Cameron's 
mental condition and the degree of the crime. Despite occa-
sional waivering, however, Cameron clung resolutely and 
emphatically during this hour-long interrogation to his total 
lack of memory of the events in question. We therefore con-
clude that in spite of his youth and inexperience with the 
police, the lack of any warnings of his rights, and his intoxi-
cation and emotional turmoil, Cameron's will to resist was 
not overborne during the first interrogation. 
[6b] Although the coherence, rationality, and responsive-
ness of Cameron's answers, which were relied upon by the 
referee, are material in determining the extent to which 
alcohol alone may have impaired his mental facilities, they 
shed no light on the effect of the Thorazine that was adminis-
tered to Cameron before he made the last three statements. 
Moreover, during the course of these statements, Cameron 
allowed himself to be persuaded by leading questions that he 
remembered more and more of th~ details of the crime, includ-
ing some alleged details that did riot in fact occur. 
At 3 :30 a.m., Cameron was given 300 mgs.fl of Thorazine. 
Dr. Burbridge, a University of California Medical Center 
psychiatrist who specializes in pharmacology and is an expert 
on the interaction between Thorazine and alcohol, testified 
that the drug was originally developed as a pre-anesthetic 
medication to "be given to patients to destroy any anxiety they 
might feel about oncoming surgery. The drug affects a person 
mentally by reducing the normal anxiety reactions to a point 
where he is no longer disturbed by what normally would be 
upsetting factors in his environment. " [T]hey get in such a 
psychiatric state that input from the environment no longer 
disturbs them, and hence under the circumstances here in 
which a person should be keyed to the maximum by the sur-
roundings that he is faced with, of being questioned about a 
thing that may involve his life, ••. he wouldn't care about 
GAil doctors concurred in their opinion that 300 mgs. was inordinately 
high for an initial dose. Dr. Burbridge described the effect of .aclminis-
tering a 300 mg. initial close of Thorazino to a subjcet with a .18 percent 
alcohol blood level as a "cl,'ug·inclueecl lobotomy within reasonable medi· 
cal probabilities," Dr. Jackson, one of the prosecution's doctors, de-
scribed a lobotomy as a procedure during which the anxiety or worry 
nerves are s~vered, s:> tJrat messages conveying anxiety or worry are 
prevented from reacbing the brain. All doctors concurred in the opinion 
that tile pntient's ability to think would not be otherwise impaired to any 
gl'CIl t tlcgree. 
f· 
• 
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it, it wouldn't bother or concern him .... 7 [T]he type of 
state provoked by this ... drug is such that an individual 
would be in a position ... that he doesn't care what hap-
pens to llim, that he is not aware that he is being charged 
with a serious crime, ... and it doesn't bother him that he 
is, and if the confession must be a free and voluntary one, he 
must be keyed to the peak and be able to defend himself, 
under such a circumstance."8 According to the testimony of 
Dr. Burbridge, Dr. Catton and Dr. Adams, presented by the 
defense, and Dr. Jackson and Dr. Swinderman, presented by 
the prosecution, alcohol and Thorazine potentiate each other. 
In Dr. Catton's words, when the two are put together, "one 
and one just isn't two, one and one is three or four." Dr. 
Burbridge testified that since the dosage given was inordi-
nately high, petitioner must have been in a borderline shock 
condition for many hours after the dose was administered, 
since any dosage larger than that normally recommended (25 
to 30 milligrams) will reduce blood pressure, cutting the flow 
of blood to the brain, and adding to the confusion of the 
individual at the time he is being questioned. 
Dr. Burbridge also testified that, based upon his experi-
ments, he believed that neither the Thorazine nor the alcohol, 
because of the potentiating effect they have upon each other, 
would be dissipated from the system within 16 hours9 from 
the time that the Thorazine was administered. 
7Dr. Jackson described the effect of Thorazine in the same terms. 
8Dr. Burbridge distinguished the reasons that a tranquilizer like Thora-
zine produces sleep from the reasons that a hypnotic drug would produce 
sleep. Tranquilizers and ]Iypnotic drugs operate upon different levels of 
the brain. A hypnotic drug will induce sleep because it operates upon the 
area of the brain that controls thought pI'ocess and consciousness. An 
individual under the influence of a Ilypnotic drug is rendered unconscious. 
A tranquilizer, on the other hand, does not operate upon the areas of the 
brain that control consciousness, but upon the areas of the brain that 
control the reactions of a conscious individual to his environment. 'I'ran-
quilizers produce sleep by I'emoving the anxiety or worry that is keep-
ing the individual awake. He is then enabled to go to sleep. However, 
he can be roused from that sleep and will behave in a conscious manner, 
despite the fact that he is still under tile influence of the drug. The drug 
is still having the effect of removing the norma] anxiety or worry reac-
tions the individual would have to his environment. With a hypnotic drug, 
on the other hand, the fact that the individual is conscious indicates that 
he is no longer under the influence of tIle drug. 
DDr. Jackson testified that the drug is normally eliminated from the 
system within eight hours. It must be noted, however, that this pre-
supposed a normal initial dose, and did not take into account the fact 
that the presence of the alcohol in the blood stream would delay by more 
.than 50 percent the rate at which the drug was dissipated. The alcohol 
) 
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Dr. Burbridge further testified that Thorazine tended to 
make a person amenable or agreetlble to the wishes of others, 
in the sense that he would become unable to see any reason to 
oppose doing what others wished of him. Under the influence 
of Thorazine, he would not resist requests made of him by 
others. Dr. Catton testified to the same effect. 
Dr. Burbridge described the physical symptoms of a person 
heavily under the influence of Thoruzine as slowed speech and 
short answers. "He won't slur his speech, as when he is 
drunk, but whereas without Thorazine he would not only 
answer a question but amplify on it, with the Thorazine the 
words will come slowly and he would make his answers as 
short as possible." Drs. Tipton and Jackson noted mental 
and physical retardation and slowness of petitioner's speech 
when they interviewed him at DeWitt State Hospital. The 
tapes show these symptoms of slowness of speech and short-
ness of answers, as compared with the more rapid speech and 
the more voluble answers appearing from the tape of Came-
ron's first interrogation. 
It thus appears from the overwhelming weight of the evi-
dence that Cameron was substantially under the influence of 
Thorazine throughout the last three interrogations and that 
his will to resist was destroyed because he was rendered 
unable to comprehend the seriousness of his predicament or 
the significance to him of acceding step by step to "remem-
bering' '10 the prosecution's reconstruction of his crime. His 
would potentiate Thorazine both ill regard to the effect the drug would 
have and the length of time during which the subject would be uuder its 
influenee. 
10All three defense psychiatrists Dr. Catton, Dr. Adams, and Dr. Bur-
bridge, and both prosecution psychiatrists, Dr. Jackson and Dr. Tipton, 
agrced that Cameron was suffering true amnesia at the time of tile trial. 
They disagreed, however, as to whether his amnesia was primary or sec-
ondary. The defense psychiatrists opined that it was primary amnesia; 
i.e., that his memory never recorded the occurrences hecaus(' he was in 
It dis80ciative state due to patll010gical intoxication at the Hme of the 
killing.' The prosecution psychiatrists opined that lie tllllTered secondary 
amnesia; i.e., tha.t he was not dissociat.ive when the killing occurre(l 
(although they agreed he was pathologically intoxicated at. the time) and 
his memory recorded the events, but subsequently blocked out tile memory 
because it wa.s too painful. It must be noted t.hat the latter seemed to 
base tlleir opinions primarly on the fact that when they interviewed 
Cameron on December 23 a.t 11 a..m., he stated tllat he "remembered" 
c.ertain of the acts he was told he had committed during his interview 
with Mr. Mulkey the night before. The only doctor who examined 
Cameron for the specifie purpose of testing his memory wa.s Dr. Adams. 
He believed Cameron was suffering prineipally from true primary 
amnesia. Part of the examination administered by Dr. Adams eonsisted 
of a. sodium pentothol test. Sodium pentothol is a hypnotic drug that is 
,. 
) 
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confessiuns dllriug those interrogations were not "the product 
of a ratiunal inh'lIec·t uJI(I a free will." (Blackbllrn v . .Llla-
bat/ta, supra, 361 U.S. 199, 208 [4 hEtl.2tl 242, 249, 80 8. Ct. 
274] .) 
[lOa] The Attorney General eontends, howeyer, that 
Cameron's failure to object to the admission of the second 
confession at the trial precludes his challenging its admissi-
bility now. [l1a] He further contends that any error in 
the trial court's rulings admitting the tllird and fourth confes-
sions into evidence is harmless because the first and second 
confessions were properly in evidence. There is no merit in 
these contentions. 
[lOb] From the record at th~ trial it appears as a matter 
of law that the second confession was involuntary. In such a 
case, a defendant is not precluded from raising the issue on 
appeal even though he did not object in the trial court. (Peo-
ple v. Matteson (1964) 61 Ca1.2d 466, 469 [39 Ca1.Rptr. 1, 3!!g 
P.2d 161], and cases eited; see also People v. Castro (1968) 
257 Cul.App.2d 643, 645-646 [65 Cal.Rptr. 62] ; People v. Rand 
(1962) 202 Cal.App.2d 668, 672-674 [21 Cal.Rptr. 89].) Since 
Cumeron's abandonment of his appeal is excusable, he may 
properly challenge the second confession for the first time in 
these proceedings. 
Moreover, even if the second confession were deemed 
properly in evidence, it would not render harmless the error 
in admittillg the third and fourth confessions. [12] Ordi-
narily, the introduction into evidence of an unconstitutionally 
obtained confession compels reversal regardless of other evi-
dence of guilt. (See People v. Powell (1967) 67 Ca1.2d 32, 
51-52 [59 Cal.Rptr. 817,429 P.2d 137], and cases cited.) We 
have recognized an exception to that rule in the case of a 
confession obtained in violation of Escobedo v. Illinois (1964) 
378 U.s. 478 [12 hEd.2d 977, 84 S.Ct. 1758], and People v. 
Dorado (1965) 62 Ca1.2d 338 [42 Ca1.Rptr. 169, 398 P.2d 
361], when there was also in evidence an equally or more 
damaging admissible confession made before the inadmis-
sible confession and thus there was no danger that tlle 
former was the product of the latter. (People v. Cotter 
(1965) 63 Cal.2d 386, 398 [46 Cal.Rptr. 622, 405 P.2d 
used with amnesics, as it enables the doctor to place the patient in a 
drug·induced hypnotic state and discover whether there is a memory 
despite tile ll1pntal block. Although the results of the sodium pentothol 
test arc not admissible, Dr. Adams testified that his (:iagnosis of true 
pl'illlury amnesia was confirmed by the l'esults of the test. 
I 
I 
I 
I 
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L.Ed.2d 43, 87 S.Ct. 1035]; People v. Jacobson (1965) 63 
Ca1.2d 319, 329-331 [46 Cal.Rptr. 515, 405 P.2d 555].) We 
need not decide whether this exception may also apply in the 
case of an involuntary confession, for in no event is it 
applicable when, as in the present case, "the admissible evi-
dence does not include an equally damaging confession." 
(People v. Price (1965) 63 Ca1.2d 370, 377 [46 Cal.Rptr. 775, 
406 P.2d 55] j People v. Powell, supr{l, 67 Ca1.2d 32, 54.) 
[llb] In determining Cameron's criminal responsibility 
for the homicide, a critical issue was the extent of his intoxi-
cation and his state of mind at the time of the killing. Evi-
dence of his memory of the events was crucial to that issue. 
(See footnote, 10, supra.) In his confession to the psychia-
trists, Cameron purported to remember only the barest details 
of the crime, details that Mr. Mulkey had reported to him the 
night before and passed on to the psychiatrists before their 
interview. By the time of the third and fourth confessions, the 
officers had learned many more details of the crime and had 
informed Cameron of them. He purported to remember these 
details for the first time in his third and fourth confessions, 
and his memory of them, if real, was devastating to his 
defense. 
Although the judgment must be set aside because of the use 
of Cameron's involuntary confessions against him, it is neces-
sary to consider the question of the loss or suppression of 
evidence. [13] The police or prosecution may disable the 
state from ever giving a defendant a fair trial if they have 
lost or destroyed or otherwise made unavailable vital defense 
evidence. (See People v. Hall (1964) 62 Ca1.2d 104, 112. fn. 8 
[41 Cal.Rptr. 284, 396 P.2d 700]; In re Imbler, supra, 60 
Ca1.2d 554, 567; PeOple v. Carter (1957) 48 Ca1.2d 737, 747 
[312 P.2d 665].) If this were such a case, Cameron should be 
discharged rather than remanded for a new trial. 
[14] The referee found that no evidence was suppressed, 
but that two items had been lost. One was a colored film taken 
of the interior of the trailer shortly after the arrival of the 
• police, and the second was a man's plaid shirt depicted in a 
photograph as being under the body's right forearm. The 
referee found that the colored film depicted the same areas 
shown in black and white photographs, and that the photo-
graphs were of better quality than the film. He concluded that 
the film would have been merely cumulative of other evidence 
available to the defense. He found that the shirt had been 
I 
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identified as the victim's by her sister-in-law and would not 
have been material to indicate that someone other than Came-
ron and Mrs. Malone were in the trailer at the time of the 
killing. He therefore concluded that neither item would have 
aided the defense in any material manner. 
The record fully supports the referee's findings and conclu-
sions in this respect, and we adopt them. Accordingly, Came-
ron is not entitled to be discharged. 
The writ is granted. The judgment against Cameron is set 
aside and he is remanded to the custody of the Superior Court 
of Butte County for a new trial. 
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., and Sullivan J., concurred. 
MOSK, J.-I dissent. 
There is no question that habeas corpus is a proper remedy 
to challenge violations of constitutional rights relevant to the 
determination of guilt if the petitioner presents an adequate 
excuse for failing to invoke his remedy by appeal. I do not 
believe that a valid excuse exists under the circumstances 
before us. 
The majority adopt a subjective test: what were peti-
tioner's innermost fears, apprehensions and motives at the 
time he abandoned his earlier appeal T He is an intelligent 
young man, a college student, and was represented by able 
counsel of his own choice. It cannot be doubted that abandon-
ment of the appeal was a deliberate step taken after mature 
reflection. To presently undertake a search of the deepest 
recesses of his mind as of that earlier date in order to fathom 
motivation impresses me as a chimerical and futile exercise. 
In the absence of some objective manifestation of reasonable 
reliance upon erroneous or outmoded legal authority, aban-
donment of the appeal should preclude granting relief in 
these habeas corpus proceedings. 
If it be assumed arguendo that some circumstances could 
justify relief under the majority's subjective formula, the 
writ should nevertheless be denied here. 
This petitioner was convicted of murder in the first degree 
after an exhaustive trial in which he was defended by vigor-
ous and experienced counsel. Two earlier trials had resulted 
in jury disagreement. In the first two trials no objection was 
made to the introduction of any of the confessions. In the 
third trial, no objection was made to the first two confessions, 
but only to the third and fourth statements. 
) 
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This court held in People v. Matteson (1964) 61 Ca1.2d 466, 
469 [39 Cal.Rptr. 1,393 P.2J 1G1], that the "introduction of 
an involuntary confession or admission requires reversal of a 
judgment of conviction despite defendant's failure to object 
to its introduction." (Also see People v. Underwood (1964) 
61 Ca1.2d 113, 126 [37 Cal.Rptr. 313, 389 P.2d 937].) Cate-
gorically stated, that is sound law. But its application is not 
invariable. 
Not infrequently counsel choose defense trial tactics which 
dictate that a statement, even though properly objectionable, 
be received in evidence. To permit raising the issue of 
admissibility for the first time on llabeas corpus . long after 
conviction would place our stamp of approval on strategy of 
opportunism. As long ago as People v. Kramer (1897) 117 
Cal. 647, 650-651 [49 P. 842], this court said: "It is an obvi-
ously just rule that such objection cannot be here made for 
the first ti~ne .... 'rile defendant cannot remain silent and 
take the chance of a favorable issue, and, losing, 'urge as 
ground for reversal an error, which, but for his silence, might 
never have found its way into the case. His failure to object 
justly gives rise to the inference that at the time he saw no 
injury being done him, and he cannot complain on being met 
here by a barrier arising 1rom his own omission. " 
'Vhen· defense counsel raised no objection to the introdue-
tioll of any of the confessions in the first two trials and none 
to the first two confessions in the third trial, it must be 
assumed this omission was by design. Indeed, there is ample 
reason to conclude that not only did counsel deem the state-
ments nonprejudieial but they also believed the manifest 
remorse of the petitioner to be beneficial to his cause. Their 
maneuver obviously did not fail in the first two trials. Our 
role on review is not to second-guess trial tactics, nor to 
reward calculated strategy wllieh was ultimately frustrated 
below. (People v. Reeves (1966) 64 Ca1.2d 766 [51 Cal.Rptr. 
691, 415 P.2d 35].) Y<>t the majority do so when they COIl-
demn as inadmissible statcments which defense counsel con-
sidered properly before the jury. The consequence of the 
majority opinion, though not explicitly stated, is to expect a 
trial court to reject sua sponte evidence t.o which neither 
party offers an objection and which both parties desire in the 
record. This is an unreasonably heroic requirement for trial 
judges. 
I<'inally, the majority undertake to reweigh the facts 
anothrr time and to reach a conclusion on the voluntariness. of 
) 
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defendant's eonfessions contrary to that of the original trier 
of fact, and contrary to the considered findings of the referee 
appointed by this court, Judge Perluss of the Sacramento 
Superior Court. I would adopt thc facts found and the 
conclusions reached by the referee, and I do so in haec verba 
(references to the transcripts have been omitted) : 
4. The evidence 
a. The taped confess-ion made at approx'imately 1 a.m. on 
December 23, 1958. 
Petitioner's first confession was taped and was made at 
approximately 1 a.m. on December 23, 19li8, in the Chico police 
station in the presence of a sheriff's captain and a deputy 
district attorney. At the commencement of the interrogation, 
tile deputy district attorncy smelled the odor of alcohol on 
petitioner's breath and requested Dr. Ted Oster, a qualified 
medical doctor, to give petitioner a sobriety test. Dr. Oster 
conducted various tests including the Romberg test and other 
physical tests and determined that petitioner was "mentally 
alert. " lIe was of the opinion that petitioner's mind was 
working in a "rational manner" and was not under the 
influence of alcohol insofar as the drunk driving laws were 
concerned despite a blood alcohol count of .18. 
The deputy district attorney stated that the petitioner was 
lucid and the sheriff's captain indicated that the petitioner 
understood the questions he was asked and talked intelli-
gently. 
The taped confession was played at the reference hearing. 
To the referee it appeared that petitioner's voice was some-
what slurred but his answers were rational and he seemed 
coherent. In the middle of the tape petitioner began to cry 
and he cried and broke down at the end of the tape. Neverthe-
less, he was able to answer questions such as those relating to 
the residence of his parents, where he went to school, the age 
of his child and an' adapter for his camera. Unquestionably, 
petitioner was emotionally upset and remorseful but the 
referee does not believe that he was irrational and that he 
did not exercise his own judgment in making the first 
confession. 
b. The confession made at DeWitt State Hospital at 
approx'irnately 11 a.m. on December 23, 1958 . 
. After his first interrogation and confession, petitioner was 
taken to the Butte County Hospital where he was admitted liS 
a mental hold to prevent him from harming IJimself. At 
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approximately 3 :30 a.m., Nurse Julia Caton administered 300 
mgs. of Thorazine to petitioner at the direction of Dr. Paul R. 
Swinderman. Dr. Swinderman did not see petitioner per-
sonally and did not know he had been drinking. He testified 
that the drug would cause a person under the influence of 
alcohol to take a longer time than usual in becoming sober. 
At approximately 9 a.m. petitioner was taken to DeWitt 
State Hospital in Auburn. He dozed at times en route and had 
juice, coffee and doughnuts in the town of Lincoln. Petitioner 
arrived at the hospital at approximately 11 a.m. where he was 
examined by Drs. Carl Jackson and G. D. Tipton, psychia-
trists. The petitioner told the doctors the facts which he 
remembered which were a confession of the crime. 
The doctors did not know that Thorazine had been adminis-
tered to petitioner. He appeared to be suffering from a hang-
over, his clothing was disheveled and he held his head as 
though he had a headache. His speech was slow. 
Although there can be no question but that petitioner 
received an unusually massive dosage of Thorazine, a fair 
reading of the evidence establishes that petitioner was able to 
exercise his judgment in making his second confession. 
Dr. Thomas Burbridge, petitioner's witness, said: " Yes, 
one of the characteristics of the, of a tranquilizer is, as com-
pared to an ordinary hypnotic sedative, is what, as a matter 
of fact is one of the ways you separate them from an ordinary 
hypnotic sedative, like a barbiturate, or alcohol, is that he is 
easier aroused. The person will sleep but then if you shake 
him and wake him up and put a question to him he will be 
able to answer it, or he will be able to, if he could, he is 
stimulated enough to playa bridge game, but he will not play 
his best game, and his questions will not be answered with 
clarity that it ordinarily would be." 
Dr. Burbridge also said: 
"Q. Now thorazine is a tranquilizer' 
"A. Thorazine is a tranquilizer. If a large dose is given, 
enough to produce sleep, you will awaken the person. he will 
arouse easily, he will answer questions quite well without any 
trouble at all. 
"Q. Even with a fairly heavy dose 7 
"A. With a fairly, with a fairly heavy dose, yes. II 
As to the combined effects of alcohol and Thorazine, Dr. 
Burbridge, in commenting on the third interrogation of peti-
tioner at 1 :30 p.m., approximately two llOurs subsequent to 
the instant confession, testified that he would not state that 
) 
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petitioner's free will was destroyed and that he had the 
ability to choose whether he would answer questions or not. 
A portion of the recross-examination of Dr. G. D. Tipton by 
Judge Friedman, petitioner's counsel, at petitioner's second 
trial is of interest: 
"Q. I see. Well, doctor, let me ask you this: Isn't it a fact 
the people who have been given thorazine are readily amena-
ble to suggestion T 
•• A. I can't say that they are. I don't know why they 
should be. 
"Q. Well, neither do I, doctor. It is your opinion they are 
not, is that right' 
" A. Yes, that is right." 
c. The taped confession. made at approximately 3 p.m. on 
December 23, 1958. 
Upon completion of his interview at DeWitt State Hospital, 
petitioner was taken to the Bureau of Criminal Identification 
an~ Investigation in Sacramento where he again was interro-
gated. Two polygraph examinations were run. The referee 
pe~mitted limited inquiry of Mr. Joseph F. McVarish, the 
then polygraph operator, as to whether petitioner's responses 
fluctuated normally for the purpose of ascertaining whether 
at that time petitioner was under the influence of alcohol or 
Thorazine or both. Petitioner was normally responsive and 
was alert and attentive. 
This taped confession also was played at the hearing. Peti-
tioner's voice was not slurred and he was able to remember 
details of the crime. 
The referee believes that petitioner did exercise his own 
judgment in making this confession. 
d. The confession made at approximately 8 p.m. on Decem-
ber 23, 1958. 
Following the interrogation in Sacramento, petitioner was 
taken to the Butte County jail in Oroville, arriving at about 
6 p.m. At approximately 8 p.m., petitioner was interrogated 
and again confessed. This confession, too, was tape recorded. 
Petitioner contends that then he was threatened by Sheriff 
Gillick who questioned him. The tape confession was played 
at the hearing. The referee is unable to find any threats in 
manner, tone of voice or in content. 
A closer question is presented by petitioner's assertion that 
he was questioned after his counsel had informed the sheriff 
not to question petitioner without an attorney being present. 
) 
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Judge Barr, petitioner's former counsel, was unable to 
assist the referee in this regard at the reference hearing. At 
petitioner's third trial, however, Judge Barr testified that he 
phoned Sheriff Gillick in the afternoon of December 23, and 
requested him nut to interrogate petitioner further. Mr. Alex-
ander Camerc;m, petitioner's father, states he heard Judge 
Barr make this statement over the telephone. 
On the other hand, Sheriff Gillick testified that Judge Barr 
asked only where petitioner was and said nothing about state-
ments. Thelma Mosely, the sheriff's secretary, had been 
directed to listen to the telephone conversation. She testified 
Judge Barr said nothing about statements or interrogations. 
After reviewing the conflicting evidence carefully, the 
referee has concluded that no restrictive admonition was 
given to the sheriff by counsel before petitioner's interroga-
tion. Even if this were not so, the referee believes that the 
"rare case'" principle of which Mr. Justice Moskspeaks in 
People v. Powell (July 18, 1967) 67 Cal.2d 32, 51-55 [59 Cal. 
Rptr. 817, 429 P.2d 137], would be applicable here. It would 
be an "Escobedo-Dorado rule" error, and the fourth confes-
sion added nothin~ to the three prior confessions heretofore 
found to be voluntary. 
5. The. alleged suppress-ion of evidence. 
The referee also was directed to ascertain whether represent-
atives of the State of California lost or suppressed any evi-
dence, the introduction of which would have been favorable to 
petitioner's defense. 
The referee finds that no evidence was suppressed. It does 
appear, however, that two items have been lost. 
The first item was a roll of colored motion picture' film of 
the victim's trailer which was lost prior to the first trial. No 
evidence was offered to the referee to indicate that the film 
would have been favorable to petitioner. To the contrary, the 
former district attorney who had viewed the film testified that 
the still photographs used at the trials were far better in 
clarity. 
The second lost item is what appears to be a man's style 
plaid shirt depicted in Petitioner's Exhibit 5a. The picture 
was taken before the body was moved and the shirt was under 
the victim's right forearm. The shirt was not produced and 
apparently was lost. 
The victim's sister-in-law, Mrs. Elsie Robinson, specifically 
identified the plaid shirt as belonging to the victim, and,its 
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absence was used by petitioner's counsel to suggest that a 
person other than petitioner had committed the crime. The 
referee cannot find that the lost plaid shirt if produced would 
have been favorable to petitioner's defense. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Responsive to the questions propounded by the Court, it is 
found: 
1. Despite petitioner's consumption of alcoholic beverages, 
his taped confession made at approximately 1 a.m. on Decem-
ber 23. 1958, was voluntary. 
2. D('spite petitioner's consumption of alcoholic beverages 
and the administration to him of Thorazine, his confession 
made to the physicians at De Witt State Hospital at approxi-
mately 11 a.m. on December 23, 1958, was voluntary. 
3. Despite petitioner's consumption of alcoholic beverages 
and the administration to him of Thorazine, his taped confes-
sion made at approximately 3 p.m. on December 23, 1958, was 
voluntary. 
4. 'l'he taped confession petitioner made at approximately 
8 p.m. on December 23, 1958, was voluntary. 
5. No evidence was suppressed or lost by any representative 
of the State of California the introduction of which would 
have been favorable to petitioner's defense. 
I would therefore deny the petition. 
McComb, J., and Burke, J., concurred. 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied May 22, 
1968. McComb, J., Mosk, J., and Burke, J., were of the opinion 
that the petition should be granted. 
